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Abstract 
Network externality can encourage adoption when a 
network is growing in size. Network externality, however, 
can also encourage abandoning when a network is getting 
small. Therefore, the challenger’s action focusing on 
persuading a part of the market can eventually affect the 
whole market when network externality is at work. 
This paper discusses two local attacking strategies, 
namely, “focusing on the high-end” and “focusing on the 
low-end”, and compares their effects. The conclusions 
show that the former strategy generally exhibits stronger 
eventual effects than the latter. Although direct effects are 
local, the eventual effects could be global when network 
externality is strong and/or consumers have small 
differences in their reservation prices. 
Based on our results, the incumbent should set a price 
keeping all installed users away from being stranded. If 
any installed user gives up the incumbent’s technology, 
he or she may be the fuse to trigger the chain reaction. 
Thus, a better approach is to “make the fuse wet”. To the 
challenger, local attacking strategies work better when 
network externality is strong and/or reservation prices of 
installed users are nearly the same. 
 
Keyword: Network Externality, Attacking Strategies, 
Targeting 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Network externality is the phenomenon that adopters’ 
utility increases with the number of equivalent adopters 
[5] [6] [7] [14] [20]. Network externality has proven itself 
as a hot topic in the fields of economics and management. 
Moreover, it manifests undoubted relevance in 
information economies. Telephone, email [3] and 
computer operation systems are the most representative 
products characterized by network externality. It also 
exhibits the property of increasing return [2] [18], and 
various inefficiencies [8] [11] therefore shaping a new 
business model in information economies. 
Applicable are conventional and classic strategic 
thinking: building alliance, taking first-mover advantages, 
and managing consumers’ expectation [19]. However, 
various counter-intuitive but insightful strategies are 
proposed and analyzed in the context of network 
externality. For instance, allowing piracy in software 
markets [9], planned obsolescence [13], introducing 
“clones” [10], predatory pricing under some conditions 
[4], and providing an adapter [1]. Analyzing the 
characteristics and influences of network externality can 
help managers apply economic principles to improve on 
their decisions such as product line design, pricing 
strategies, property rights and taking advantage of lock-in 
effect [18]. 
We follow the research [21] that explained why 
challenger firm can win over incumbent firm in industries 
characterized by network externality. Theoretically, 
network externality stands on the incumbent’s side and 
creates enormous switching costs for installed users, or 
namely, the installed base. Based on the work [12], 
challengers have little chance to successfully penetrate 
into industries characterized by network externality. 
However, it is interesting to note that in the history of 
industry this theoretical inference is not followed. The 
phenomenon that challengers win over incumbents takes 
place again and again. [21] successfully explained the 
phenomenon existed in growing markets. By contrast, 
attacking strategies in this paper can explain the same 
phenomenon even when markets do not grow in sizes. 
One of the competitive strategies is seeking for 
sponsorship. Sponsorship can help one of the oligopolists 
to offer a lower price than marginal cost and thus gain 
competitive edge against the rival [15]. 
Another frequently cited research [17] showed that 
firms might race excessively and incompatibly in 
research and development. The government can take on 
the “force licensing” policy to slow down this race to 
improve social welfare. Our paper, on the other hand, 
proposes that the challenger firm can use local attacking 
strategies without interventions of governments. 
Before we introduce this paper’s purpose, we first 
come to the precise deinition of “local attacking 
strategies”. Marketing activities can be utilized to target 
the whole market or to target at a specific segment. 
Marketing activities, such as advertising or promotional 
campaign, utilized to target the whole market can be very 
expensive and lost of focus. On the other hand, marketing 
activities can be utilized to target at a specific segment. 
We name these marketing activites “local attacking 
strategies” because they do not attempt to pursuade the 
whole market, by contrast, a particular part of the market. 
We will show that focusing on a rather small segment can 
affect the choice of the whole market in the context of 
network externality. 
Briefly, the purpose of this paper is to illustrate that 
attacking strategies by the challenger can destruct the 
 incumbent’s installed base. In this paper, the effects of 
two local attacking strategies are analyzed and compared. 
One strategy is “focusing on the high-end” and the other 
is “focusing on the low-end”. This paper will show that 
local attacking strategies not only have local direct effect, 
but also have global eventual effect on the number of the 
incumbent’s installed users. 
The attempt of this paper is new in the fields of 
industrial organization and management science. Firstly, 
this paper shows that network externality can amplify the 
effect of a challenger’s attracking strategies. Although the 
direct effect of attacking strategies is local, the strategic 
effect amplified by network externality could be 
enormous. 
Explaining the similar phenomemon, this paper 
attempts to extend [21] to explain the challenger’s victory 
even without a growing market. The increasing return 
property of network externality is well known but, 
however, network externality also makes a network more 
vulnerable when a network is under attack. 
This paper is organized as follows. The current section 
describes this paper’s purpose, importance and status in 
the literature. The next section describes the model. The 
third section solves the problem and discusses the results. 
Finally, the conclusion is drawn. 
 
2. Model 
 
The model consists of one incumbent firm, one 
challenger firm and a number (M) of users. The 
incumbent possesses a technology and set a price for 
usage right in a specific time period, for instance a year. 
Every user in the market is assumed to have paid for the 
technology in the previous time period but needs to 
decide whether to pay the incumbent again for the 
coming year’s usage. That is, the incumbent firm 
occupies the market in the beginning of the model. 
This paper does not analyze the dynamic and 
competitive issues between the incumbent and the 
challenger. The focus is put on the one-shot effect of the 
challenger’s attacking strategies and network externality 
between technology adopters. The analysis is limited to 
the scope in which the challenger takes one strategy and 
the incumbent is not ready to notice or react to the 
challenger’s attack. Thus, the game theoretical view is 
not applied on the interactions of the incumbent and the 
challenger, but applied on the interactions between 
technology adopters. 
Since the challenger is new in the market, he/she may 
concentrate his/her marketing resources to attract some 
(locally), but not all (globally), of the consumers in the 
market. Intuitively, “focusing on the high-end” and 
“focusing on the low-end” are two candidate strategies. 
The only decision to be made in this model is 
challenger’s strategy. 
Let us first elaborate these strategies. The term “high-
end” refers to consumers, who may have higher income 
or wealth, possessing higher reservation prices. By 
contrast, the other term “low-end” refers to consumers 
possessing lower reservation prices. Moreover, “focusing 
on the high-end” strategy is concentrating marketing 
resources to target consumers with higher reservation 
prices. On the other hand, “focusing on the low-end” 
strategy is concentrating marketing resources to target 
consumers with lower reservation prices for the 
incumbent’s technology. 
It is hard to judge which of these two strategies is 
better. The former, “focusing on the high-end”, may lead 
the challenger to seize a higher-margin segment as a 
niche. On the other hand, “focusing on the low-end” may 
help the challenger expand its market share in a higher 
speed. 
To reflect the direct effects of these two strategies, we 
model the former strategy, “focusing on the high-end”, in 
a way that a challenger moves the consumer with the 
highest reservation price out of the incumbent’s installed 
base. Similarily, we model the latter strategy, “focusing 
on the low-end”, in a way that a challenger moves the 
consumer with the lowest reservation price out of the 
incumbent’s installed base. The consumer, who is 
“targeted” by a challenger, “uninstall” the incumbent’s 
system and stops using the incumbent’s technology, and 
consequently leave no value to other consumers and the 
incumbent. 
The incumbent charges a price at the end of the model 
to every consumer who decides to renew the contract 
with the incumbent. One must notice that in this paper the 
incumbent is assumed to set a price maximizing his/her 
short-term profit without considering the competition. 
Thus, the incumbent’s price is fixed when consumer 
reservation prices and the strength of network externality 
are given. In other words, the incumbent does not expect 
the emergence of the challenger. Accordingly, this paper 
does not attempt to provide any equilibrium but the 
optimal move (the optimal local attacking strategy) for 
the challenger. 
To clearly identify every consumer and his or her 
reservation price, we next sort and give subscript “ i ” to 
consumers by their reservation prices. Moreover, 
consumer Ci’s reservation price is called Pi. Accordingly, 
The consumer with the lowest reservation price, P1, is 
called C1 in this paper and correspondingly the consumer 
with the highest reservation price, PM, is indexed as CM. 
Consumers decide in a sequence of C1, C2, …, CM. 
Therefore, we set that there are M periods and M 
consumers. In the first period, the consumer (C1 or CM) 
who is targeted by the challenger refuses to pay the 
incumbent again. In the following M － 1 periods, 
consumers decide in a sequence (C2, C3…, CM or C1, 
C2, …, CM-1) and just one consumer decides in each 
period, respectively. The sequence may reflect the reality 
well because the consumer with a lower reservation price 
is more sensitive to market change such as the 
challenger’s strategic actions. On the contrary, the 
consumer with a higher reservation price is more satisfied 
with the incumbent’s system thus less willing to search 
for alternatives. 
The distribution of consumers’ reservation prices 
indeed matters. We assume that distribution follows a 
 linear pattern of Pi＝ a*i+b＋ r*(n－ 1), where “n” 
represents the number of consumers who still are 
installed users of the incumbent’s technology. That is, P1 
equals a＋b＋r*(n－1) and PM equals a*M＋b＋r*(n－
1). The parameter “a” thus represents the reservation 
price difference between consumers. On the other hand, 
the parameter “r” therefore represents the strength of 
network externality. 
The linear pattern of reservation prices of consumers 
is a approximity of uniform distribution setting [14]. On 
the other hand, the linearity of network utility on the 
number of adopters is following the model of [21] and 
similar to the setting [16]. 
The incumbent’s price, P, also plays an important role 
in the effectiveness of a challenger’s attacking strategies. 
Intuitively, a higher price without losing any consumer 
can generate the maximal short-term profit. How much 
can the incumbent charge? In order to retain all of 
consumers in the system, the price cannot exceed the 
lowest reservation price P1 with n＝M. Moreover, any 
price beneath P1, statically, does not attract more 
consumers but only directly reduce the profit. To focus 
on the effect of  a challenger’s attacking strategies, the 
price set by the incumbent is modeled to be P＝a＋b＋
r*(n－1). The price set by the incumbent is modeled as a 
constant in this paper. The only decision is made by the 
challenger to choose one of the two attacking strategies. 
The model operates as follows. The incumbent sets a 
price equal to P＝a＋b＋r*(n－1), equivalently a＋b＋
r*(M－1). Next, the challenger decides to target at CM, 
the consumer with the highest reservation price, or C1, the 
consumer with the lowest reservation price. These two 
approaches are named “focusing on the high-end” and 
“focusing on the low-end”, respectively. In the mean time, 
the consumer targeted by a challenger does not pay the 
incumbent again. Finally, the remaining consumers 
decide whether to renew the contract with the incumbent 
and pay the price in a sequence specified above. The 
number of consumers who do not pay the incumbent 
again measures the effectiveness of attacking strategies. 
For easy reference, we list notations used throughout 
this paper in the following. 
Ci: the consumer with the ith low reservation price 
Pi: the reservation price of Ci consumer 
a: the reservation price difference between consumers 
Ck and Ck+1, where k is an integer between 1 and M－1 
r: the strength of two-way network externality 
between any pair of consumers 
n: the number of consumers who still use the 
incumbent’s technology in the current period 
M: the total number of consumers in the market 
P: the price set by the incumbent which is equal to P1 
with n＝M, that is, P＝a＋b＋r*(n－1) 
 
3. Analysis 
 
Now we start to analyze the first targeting strategy: 
“focusing on the high-end”. A challenger concentrates his 
or her marketing resources to target the consumer with 
the highest reservation price. The effects of such 
attacking strategy are shown as Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Effects of “focusing on the high-end” 
strategy 
 
Firstly, the targeted consumer does not pay for the 
incumbent’s technology (Effect I), that is the direct effect. 
Since consumers’ reservation prices are constructed upon 
other consumers’ equivalent adoptions, the reservation 
prices of remaining consumers all drop an amount of r 
(Effect II). Consequently, the reservation prices of some 
consumers may fall beneath the incumbent’s price and 
refuse to pay it (Effect III). Moreover, some other 
consumers abandon the incumbent’s technology and the 
reservation prices drop more. Those effects (Effects II 
and III) form a self-reinforcing loop, which is triggered 
by the “focusing on the high-end” strategy (Effect I). 
Although only one consumer is affected initially by the 
challenger’s strategy, more than one consumer is 
eventually affected. The argument is proved more 
rigorously in the following. 
 
Proposition 1： 
When the challenger uses the “focusing on the high-
end” strategy and 2≥
r
a
, eventually 2 consumers will 
not pay for the incumbent’s technology. 
 
Proof: 
When consumer CM is targeted and does not pay the 
incumbent again, all consumers’ reservation prices drop 
an amount of r. Consumer C1’s reservation price now 
becomes a＋b＋(M－2)*r, which is below the price, a＋
b＋(M－1)*r, set by the incumbent. Consumer C1 refuses 
to pay the incumbent again. Next, consumer C2’s 
reservation price thereafter becomes 2a＋b＋(M－3)*r, 
which is above the price, a＋b＋(M－1)*r, set by the 
incumbent when 2≥
r
a
. Consumer C2 pays the price 
and stays as an installed user and the stop-point of the 
chain reaction of abandoning. The consumers (C3~CM-1) 
with a higher reservation price than C2 deservedly pay the 
 price for the incumbent’s technology. Only C1 and CM are 
affected by the challenger’s strategy. Proposition 1 is 
proved. 
Under another condition, 
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−
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− k
k
r
a
k
k
, the 
effect of “focusing on the high-end” strategy would be 
stronger. 
 
Proposition 2： 
When the challenger uses the “focusing on the high-
end” strategy and 
2
1
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−
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− k
k
r
a
k
k
, eventually k 
consumers will not pay for the incumbent’s technology, 
where k is a positive integer between 3 and M－1. 
 
Proposition 3： 
When the challenger uses the “focusing on the high-
end” strategy and 
2
1
−
−
<
M
M
r
a
, eventually all (M of) 
consumers will not pay for the incumbent’s technology. 
 
Proposition 4： 
When the challenger uses the “focusing on the high-
end” strategy and 1<
r
a
, eventually all (M of) 
consumers will not pay for the incumbent’s technology. 
 
When the four propositions are proved, we observe 
that the incumbent’s installed base is more “fragile” when 
reservation price difference between consumers (a) is 
smaller and/or network externality (r) is stronger. The 
more “fragile” the incumbent’s installed base is, the 
higher the incentive for the challenger to launch an 
attacking action. 
To the incumbent, what are the ways to make the 
installed base more “solid”? The reservation price 
difference between consumers (a) is a characteristic of 
the market and may be hard to change. On the other hand, 
network externality (r) can be strengthened by technical 
functions facilitating consumers’ interactions or 
providing convenience to interact with friends by the 
incumbent’s technology. 
Intuitively, the incumbent shall enhance consumers’ 
value (r) from interactions. The installed base, however, 
becomes more fragile when network externality (r) gets 
stronger. Therefore, the incremental value from 
interactions is double-edged to the incumbent. Its 
advantage is that it helps the incumbent to achieve higher 
performance in terms of consumer satisfaction or profits. 
On the other side, it makes the incumbent’s installed base 
more vulnerable. The double edge traps the incumbent 
into a dilemma whether to add consumer’s value from 
interactions. 
To the challenger, the values of “a” and “r” can help 
to estimate the effect of “focusing on the high-end” 
strategy. When “a” is relatively small and “r” is relatively 
large, the “focusing on the high-end” strategy can be 
expected to have a larger effect on the incumbent’s 
installed base. 
For instance, players in online games interact 
frequently and closely, that represents a stronger network 
externality, namely larger “r”. Players in online game 
industry mainly consist of students. They can be 
considered to have similar reservation prices. A 
challenger may concentrate his or her marketing 
resources to offer attractive deals such as free usage or 
cash rebate. According to the propositions above, the 
challenger uses the “focusing on the high-end” strategy 
and the remaining players lose contact to players who 
refuse to pay the incumbent again and lose value from 
communication with them. Some of remaining players 
may feel dissatified and do not repurchase the 
incumbent’s service. As more players swtich their choice, 
the remaining players will tend to swtich also. Those may 
form a self-reinforcing loop and make the “focusing on 
the high-end” strategy very powerful to destruct the 
incumbent’s installed base. 
 
Now let us analyze the second targeting strategy: 
“focusing on the low-end”. A challenger concentrates his 
or her marketing resources to attract the consumer with 
the lowest reservation price. The effect of such attacking 
strategy is shown as Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Effects of “focusing on the low-end” strategy 
 
First, the targeted consumer (C1) refuse to pay the 
incumbent again (Effect I), that is the direct effect. Other 
remaining consumers’ reservation prices drop an amount 
of “r” (Effect II). Consequently, the reservation prices of 
some consumers may fall beneath the incumbent’s price 
and refuse to pay it (Effect III). Accordingly, more 
consumers leave and the reservation prices drop more. 
Those (Effects II and III) form a self-reinforcing loop, 
which is triggered by the “focusing on the low-end” 
strategy (Effect I). Although only one consumer is 
affected, more than one consumers will eventually be 
affected. The argument is proved more rigorously in the 
following. 
 
Proposition 5： 
 When the challenger uses the “focusing on the low-
end” strategy and 1≥
r
a
, eventually only 1 consumer 
will not pay for the incumbent’s technology. 
 
Proposition 6： 
When the challenger uses the “focusing on the low-
end” and 1<
r
a
, eventually all (M of) consumers will 
not pay for the incumbent’s technology. 
 
Similar to propositions 1 to 4, propositions 5 and 6 
also indicate that the incumbent’s installed base is more 
“fragile” when reservation difference between consumers 
(a) is smaller or network externality (r) is stronger. The 
incumbent faces the same dilemma whether to facilitate 
consumers’ interactions and add some value to 
consumers via more convenient communication. 
One may notice that the incumbent in this model set a 
price that makes one consumer (C1) on the threshold of 
paying for the incumbent’s technology or not. The 
pricing rationale is most profitable in the short run or 
without competitors. The single on-the-threshold 
consumer, however, can be a fuse triggering the chain 
reaction of abandoning due to network externality. One 
intelligent way is to lower the price to take all consumers 
away from the threshold point, that is, “make the fuse 
wet”. Once the incumbent adopts such defensive strategy, 
the challenger may face difficulties to trigger the chain 
reaction by local attacking strategies. 
Again we turn back to the challenger. The values of 
“a” and “r” can help to estimate the effect of “focusing 
on the low-end” strategy. When “a” is relatively small 
and “r” is relatively large, the “focusing on the low-end” 
strategy can be expected to have a larger effect on the 
incumbent’s installed base. 
For instance, word processing software (such as MS 
Word) may be one of the markets consisting of 
diversifying consumers. Students, professionals and 
administrators may have different reservation prices. In 
the model, the difference of consumer reservation prices 
may be large. On the other hand, network externality may 
be low to medium, that is, the value of “r” may be small. 
Based on propositions 5 and 6, we have the theoretical 
result that the challenger’s “focusing on the low-end” 
strategy only has a limited effect. 
When two local attacking strategies are analyzed, we 
are on the position to compare their effects.  
 
Proposition 7： 
The “focusing on the high-end” strategy is more 
effctive than the “focusing on the low-end” strategy when 
1≥
r
a
. 
 
Proposition 8： 
The “focusing on the high-end” and “focusing on the 
low-end” strategies are the same effective when 1<
r
a
. 
 
To be clear, proposition 1 to 8 are summarized in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of two local attacking strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Table 1, we find that “focusing on the 
high-end” strategy is superior to the “focusing on the 
low-end” strategy in some cases however only the same 
effective in other cases. To sum up, “focusing on the 
high-end” strategy weakly dominates “focusing on the 
low-end” strategy in the context of network externality. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper analyzes the effects of two local attacking 
strategies by a challenger. The “focusing on the high-end” 
strategy is found superior to “focusing on the low-end” 
strategy in some industry scenarios. 
Two local attacking strategies are shown to have larger 
eventual effects than the direct effects in the context of 
network externality. That is, local attacking strategies 
although only have limited direct effects but can trigger 
the chain reaction, which results in larger eventual effects. 
By analysis of this paper, a challenger can estimate the 
effect of his or her local attacking strategies. When 
consumers have same similar reservation prices, the chain 
reaction is easier to be triggered and local attacking 
strategies have significant effects. On the contrary, local 
attacking strategies only have limited or local effects 
when consumers are very distinct in their reservation 
prices. The reason is that chain reaction is harder to be 
triggered. 
In addition to consummers’ heterogeneity in 
reservation price, the strength of network externality 
should be considered when estimating effects of local 
attacking strategies. Strong network externality represents 
larger value via communication between the consumers. 
The power to strengthen and facilitate chain reaction is 
stronger when network externality is stronger. 
Accordingly, effects of local attacking strategies arise 
with network externality. 
On the contrary, weak network externality hardly 
pushes the chain reaction to go on. Therefore, the effects 
of local attacking strategies become weaker in the context 
 of weaker network externality.  
From the incumbent’s point of view, it is unwise to 
take over as much as consumers’ surplus in the industries 
characterized by network externality. One consumer, who 
is stranded or stand on the threshold of abandoning or not, 
can be the fuse to trigger a scale of chain reaction. A 
better approach is to adequately lower the price to leave 
more surplus to consumers, that can be regarded as 
“make the fuse wet” approach. Alghouth that approach 
reduces the short-run profit, it can effectively retain the 
installed base stable and subsequently the seat of 
incumbent. 
The strategic implication to the challenger is to find 
the “fuse”, the consumer(s) who are least satisfied with 
the incumbent’s current offering. “To light the fuse” can 
effectively take advantage of network externality. The 
better fuse is the high-end consumer(s) because of 
stronger eventual effects theoretically guaranteed by 
network externality. Practical targeting strategies are 
offering “rebate when old exchanged for new” or “special 
deal”, or concentrating advertising and channel efforts to 
target at the better fuse. 
Future researches extending or improving this paper 
can: (1) analyze the value of the timeliness of incumbent 
to stop the chain reaction, (2) provide defensive strategies 
and analyze their effects, (3) form a sequential attacking-
defending game for an incumbent and challenger, and (4) 
consider the cost factors and subsequently provide a 
decision support model. 
In addition, network externality between consumers 
may not always be anonymous, but local with identities. 
That is, a research may extend this paper by considering 
local network externality and find differences in results. 
Another natural extension of this paper is to consider 
different distributions of consumers’ reservation prices. 
The form of distribution can indeed affect the effects of 
attacking strategies. 
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